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Abstract
Performance measurement is a subject of some importance 
within the public sector. This study examines the design 
and development of a performance measurement 
framework within a local government department. It used 
a narrative case study approach to follow the process 
used by the design team involved. The design team began 
by examining the performance literature at a number of 
levels, and from this distilled eight design principles, from 
which they built a performance measurement framework. 
The design team encountered a number of challenges 
during this process; challenges they expected based on 
the literature. From the experiences of the design team, 
a number of hypotheses suitable for further testing 
have been derived. This study provides useful advice 
for performance measurement professionals within the 
public sector in developing frameworks grounded in 
theory, whether at the central or local government level.
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps surprisingly, there are relatively few published 
examples of public sector practices consciously grounded 
in, or reflective of, theory. This may be because practitioners 
are too busy to reflect on and publish their experience, or 
because academic recommendations are too difficult to 
make operational. While some examples exist, they are 
dwarfed in number by those that simply critique practices 
not necessarily derived from theory, or propose specific 
recommendations without testing them in practice. 
One public sector practice of interest is performance 
measurement. In the past three decades, this field has received 
a substantial amount of academic attention, growing from 
its emergence in the 1980s as part of broader trends of New 
Public Management (Boston, 1996; Butterfield, Edwards, 
& Woodall, 2004; Carter, Klein, & Day, 1992; McLendon, 
Hearn,  & Deaton, 2008; Orr, Jaeger, & Schwarzenberger, 
2007; Sanderson, 2001). The majority of this work has 
focused on central government, with a sizeable minority 
devoted to local government (Bernstein, 2001; Boyne & 
Chen, 2006; Broad, Goddard, & Von Alberti, 2007; Harris, 
2005; Johnsen, 1999; Kuhlmann, 2010; McAdam, Walker, 
& Hazlett, 2011; McLean, Haubrich, & Gutierrez-Romero, 
2007; Melkers & Willoughby, 2005; Northcott & Taulapapa, 
2012; Poister & Streib, 1999; Sanderson, 2001; Sanger, 
2008; Umashev & Willett, 2008; Wang,  2002). Multiple 
studies have been published from both descriptive and 
normative perspectives, some examining the mechanisms 
for deployment and implementation, some focusing on 
the benefits and costs of performance measurement, and 
others providing recommendations for the implementation 
of performance measurement frameworks. As noted above, 
however, very few studies have ‘closed the loop’ in taking 
those recommendations, applying them in practice, and 
seeing what occurs. The few that have done so have usually 
taken an ‘off the rack’ approach in implementing a template 
method, such as the Balanced Scorecard, and noting its 
successes and failures (Brown, 2012; Edwards & Clayton 
Thomas, 2005; Mills, Richards, Neely, Gregory, & Bourne, 
2000).
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This is a detailed case study of the design and implementation 
of a comprehensive performance measurement framework 
in a single local government department, Licensing and 
Compliance Services (LCS) within Auckland Council. As 
such, it answers several questions: how the design team 
developed the framework, what their influences were, how 
these influences affected the design, and what challenges 
they faced during the design process and subsequent 
implementation. In answering these questions, this study 
provides unique insight into a complex public sector process, 
and provides new knowledge for practice.
The author was a member of the design team, and 
consequently this study is an example of participant 
research. Readers should be cognisant of this relationship; 
while all efforts have been made to remove bias, traces may 
remain.
METHODOLOGY
Structurally, this paper mirrors the process utilised by the 
design team, allowing the reader to follow along with their 
thoughts and considerations. First, it sets out the context 
facing the team, including the key challenge. It then examines 
the literature considered by the design team, grouping this 
into both descriptive and normative categories, with the 
former group being further subdivided into three main 
types: global, local government and New Zealand-specific. 
The study then shows how this literature review was 
synthesised into eight design principles and how those 
design principles were turned into practice. Challenges with 
implementation are then briefly considered, with links to the 
literature highlighted. The study concludes by summarising 
several hypotheses noted by the design team during the 
design and implementation phases and considered worthy 
of further research. 
This study uses a descriptive case study approach; an effort 
to “offer understanding presented from another’s horizon of 
meaning” (Thomas, 2010, p. 579). It might be categorised as 
an instrumental case study in that the focus is providing 
insight into a specific issue (Stake, 1995). Some effort is 
made in the conclusion to abductively develop hypotheses 
for further testing (Thomas, 2010). No formal effort is made 
to deductively test specific hypotheses, but some of the 
commentary on issues and challenges does address these 
issues, if only summarily. 
The author was a member of the framework design team. 
Therefore, much of the information incorporated comes from 
the author’s recollections, notes and documents produced 
at the time. The literature summarised was derived directly 
from the author’s electronic reference library. No formal 
interviews were conducted for the purpose of this study, as 
it was not initially intended to externally publish the results 
of the framework design. Some effort is made in the text 
to simplify a more complex and less coherent real-world 
process into a more focused narrative. This approach can be 
best categorised as participant, rather than action, research. 
The reader should be careful not to confuse two 
methodological issues: (1) the method used to develop 
the framework, and (2) the method used to document 
that development in this study. Care is taken in the paper 
to explicitly separate these issues where relevant. This is 
particularly important in relation to the literature review: 
this review is not designed to identify where this study fits 
within the broader literature and the gap it fills, but rather 
to indicate the conceptual context within which the design 
team worked.
A key caveat on sources should be noted here. Only those 
sources utilised by the design team in their work are cited 
in the literature review section. Because of this, some more 
recent works are not present. To incorporate them post facto 
would give an incorrect indication of the influences bearing 
upon the design team at the time (early 2014).
ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT
Licensing and Compliance Services (LCS) is a department 
of approximately 250 staff within Auckland Council, a local 
government authority with approximately 8,000 staff that 
is responsible for the administration of Auckland, New 
Zealand’s largest city with 1.5 million inhabitants (Licensing 
and Compliance Services, 2014c).
Auckland Council is a relatively new organisation, and 
was formed in October 2010 as an amalgamation of eight 
councils.  LCS was formed at the same time, initially as a 
simple conglomeration of existing geographical structures. In 
2013, LCS restructured along functional lines, implementing 
four primary service delivery units:
• Environmental Health Unit: Primarily responsible 
for the licensing and inspection of retail food 
premises in Auckland. Also responsible for noise 
control and response to contamination events.
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• Alcohol Licensing Unit: Primarily responsible for 
the licensing and inspection of premises selling 
and supplying alcohol.
• Animal Management Unit: Primarily responsible 
for animal control activities under the Dog Control 
Act, including registration and response to animal 
events such as attacks or excessive barking.
• Bylaws and Compliance Unit: Responsible for 
registration of street traders, as well as responding 
to a range of bylaws issues, such as illegal signs, 
illegal street trading and public nuisance.
The initial impetus for the development of the framework 
was the arrival of a new departmental manager, alongside 
the aforementioned restructure, in 2013. The new manager 
and his lead team were not fully satisfied with the quantity 
and quality of the management intelligence provided 
them, and established a new business performance team 
(henceforth referred to as the design team) with the primary 
function of developing a new performance framework and 
associated products. 
The sole piece of specific guidance available to the team 
at the time was Auckland Council’s Integrated Performance 
Framework, described as “a cascading system of performance 
management that aligns achievement of community 
outcomes with groups of activities within the long term 
plan” (Auckland Council, 2012c). The framework provided 
little explicit guidance and detail, and in practice largely 
involved unstructured monthly reporting via a corporate 
system, and a set of specific “level of service measures”. 
The design team regarded this as insufficient and set about 
creating a framework based on first principles. A simplified 
version of this process is shown in the following diagram:
CONCEPTS SHAPING THE DESIGN
The first step for the design team was to better understand 
best practice in the field. This involved a literature review 
of both new and previously considered sources. Findings 
from this review could then be grouped into two primary 
categories: (1) descriptive and critical, and (2) specifically 
normative and recommendatory. The first category could in 
turn be subdivided into three types: (a) global issues, (b) 
local government, and (c) New Zealand-specific. 
While the majority of findings from the literature are 
summarised in the following contextual sections, some are 
noted in the sections that examine the design principles in 
detail. This positioning is largely determined by whether 
the finding provided general context and insight, or more 
specific technical guidance. Another factor is whether or not 
a particular finding was incorporated into the framework, or 
was ignored; that is, if it was noted but ignored, it could not 
be mentioned in relation to a specific design principle. Not 
all of the literature examined influenced the final design, but 
is included here to ensure a comprehensive understanding 
of the various conceptual issues considered by the design 
team. Perceptive readers may note unconscious carryings-
over from the literature to the final design principles that 
have escaped the notice of the author.
Global Issues
Public sector performance measurement became an 
increasingly important issue in the Western world in the 
1980s and 1990s (Carter et al., 1992; Fleming & Lafferty, 
2000; Poister & Streib, 1999; Propper & Wilson, 2003; 
Schick, 1996). Advocates of a new style of public service 
– sometimes termed New Public Management or NPM – 
hoped to push what were seen as slow-moving, inefficient 
and overly bureaucratic organisations closer to a private-
sector, corporate model, which would hopefully deliver 
better services for less money (Heinrich, 2002; McAdam 
Figure 1. Design Process
 4
et al., 2011; van Sluis, Cachet, & Ringeling, 2008).  A key 
theoretical underpinning of NPM was public choice theory, 
which focused on utility maximisation by individuals and 
the impact of this on political actions (Buchanan, 2003). 
Key emphases of NPM included value for money and 
efficiency (Carter et al., 1992), a focus on results rather than 
process (Cope, Leishman, & Starie, 1997), and “management 
by contract” (Sanderson, 2001; Schick, 1996), where 
public agencies would have the services to be delivered 
specified and paid for in advance. Under NPM, public sector 
agencies would more closely resemble their private sector 
counterparts, with increased contestability for services, a 
separation of policy and provision (often known as ‘steering’ 
and ‘rowing’), and greater decentralisation. Performance 
measurement, in providing a quantitative and rigorous lens 
for organisational activities, soon became an essential tool 
in enabling this evolution.
Multiple benefits of performance measurement have been 
identified, from improving value for money, improving 
managerial competence and increasing accountability 
(Collier, 2006); to enhancing communications with 
stakeholders, improving monitoring of tactical and 
strategic actions, and better resource allocation (Wang, 
2002). However, performance measurement can also have 
costs, and not merely in terms of the resources required to 
undertake measurement. Kravchuk and Schack (1996) have 
noted that “performance measures can misinform as much 
as they inform, if users are unaware of the subtle limitations 
of measurement systems” (p. 348). Flynn (1986) has put it 
bluntly: 
“At its worst, performance measurement has led to a 
concentration both on what is easily measured and what 
is susceptible to narrowly defined efficiency changes” (p. 
389).
If targets are poorly defined and lack detail, problems 
reminiscent of those encountered in command economies 
can emerge (Smith, 1990). Where there are too many 
indicators, however, there may be criticisms of unreliability, 
inflexibility and time wasting (Carter et al., 1992). There is 
thus a need to carefully balance detail and prescription with 
freedom and flexibility. There may be many indicators, but 
little understanding – a situation referred to as “DRIP” by 
some – “data rich, information poor” (Poister & Streib, 1999, 
p. 326). 
Often, public sector activities are difficult to distinguish 
from one another, have multiple principals, are produced 
in conjunction with other organisations, and unfold over 
a lengthy period (Ghobadian & Ashworth, 1994; Propper 
& Wilson, 2003; Smith, 1995a). Public sector performance 
is thus a particularly elusive concept (Bititci, Mendibil, 
Nudurupati, Garengo, & Turner, 2006; Carter et al., 1992; 
Smith, 1995a; Wisniewski & Olafsson, 2004).
There have been multiple efforts to clarify and systematise 
performance measurement concepts. One standard 
performance classification scheme is the logic model 
(sometimes termed an ‘outcomes framework’), which usually 
considers four elements: inputs, processes, outputs and 
outcomes (Flynn, 1986; NZ Office of the Auditor General, 
2002, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014; NZ State Services 
Commission and Treasury, 2008; Smith, 1995e). Often, a layer 
of intermediate outcomes, or impacts, is added between 
outputs and outcomes to indicate the first-order, rather than 
ultimate, effects of the delivery of goods and services. While 
this model has its roots in the economic literature, it has 
evolved into something somewhat different.
Local Government Issues
The English-language literature on local government 
performance measurement is dominated by large-N survey 
studies in the United States and United Kingdom, although 
Figure 2. Basic 
Logic Model
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there are some useful studies analysing other countries 
(Carmeli & Tishler, 2004; Johnsen, 2005). 
Melkers and Willoughby (2005) surveyed 300 organisations, 
and found that while most local governments had adopted 
performance measurement, few had implemented it 
meaningfully. Berman and Wang’s 2000 study showed an 
even lower level of progress, with fewer than one third of 
surveyed counties, and less than a quarter of respondents, 
seeing performance information making a meaningful 
contribution to planning. Wang’s 2002 study questioned 
the impact of performance measurement, noting that “a 
relationship between funding levels and performance is 
not always clear” (p. 35).  Poister and Streib’s 1999 study 
surveyed 1200 jurisdictions in the United States, and found 
that the majority measured output performance measures, 
but few tracked efficiency. Sanger’s 2008 study of United 
States local government showed that cities and counties 
had embraced performance measurement more than states 
had. Other research indicates that United States local 
governments continue to focus on financial performance 
(Kloot & Martin, 2000).
In the United Kingdom, there has been a recent emphasis 
by central government on measuring the work of local 
government (McAdam et al., 2011; McLean et al., 2007). 
Comprehensive Performance Assessments (CPA) were 
conducted by central agencies, evaluating local government 
service delivery in six broad areas. CPA were replaced 
by Comprehensive Area Assessments in 2009, which 
were then discontinued in 2010 and replaced with less 
elaborate auditing procedures (Audit Commission, 2013a, 
2013c). Broad and Goddard’s 2007 case studies of several 
local governments showed highly centralised planning 
and hierarchical reporting procedures for performance 
information. 
Much of the research has shown that local governments are 
still undeveloped in their approach to performance, with 
process and financial data remaining pre-eminent, and little 
linkage between performance information and deliberate 
action (Ammons, 1995; Berman & Wang, 2000; Broad et al., 
2007; Kloot & Martin, 2000; Melkers & Willoughby, 2005; 
Wang, 2002). There is relatively little clarity as to what 
determines the deployment and meaningful implementation 
of performance measurement frameworks, with both internal 
(managerial) and external (political) factors important at 
different times and in different localities (Ammons, 1995; 
de Lancer Julnes & Holzer, 2001; Johnsen, 2005; Propper & 
Wilson, 2003).
New Zealand-Specific Issues
In the 1980s, New Zealand’s public sector underwent a 
revolution, driven by New Public Management and other 
theoretical considerations (Boston, 1996; Schick, 1996; 
Scott, 2001; Scott, Bushnell, & Sallee, 1990). As a result, 
performance measurement, especially in terms of output 
measures, became central to the operations of public sector 
organisations (Griffiths, 2003; Hood, 2007; Lord, Shanahan, 
& Gage, 2005; Schick, 1996).
Every central government agency now produces, at 
minimum, a relatively comprehensive annual report that 
shows progress towards key outcome and impact targets, 
and detailed information about output performance (NZ 
Office of the Auditor General, 2002, 2014). Some efficiency 
information is provided through the use of output-based 
costing.
Local government in New Zealand consists of 78 local, 
regional, and unitary councils (Department of Internal 
Affairs, 2014; Local Government New Zealand, 2014). It is 
less advanced than central government in its approach to 
performance measurement (Northcott & Taulapapa, 2012; 
NZ Office of the Auditor General, 2010). What performance 
measurement does occur is largely driven by the requirements 
of the Local Government Act 2002 (LGA2002).
LGA2002 does not use standard performance measurement 
terminology. It states in relation to a local authority’s 
long-term plan (a ten year strategic document) that it 
must “include a statement of the intended levels of service 
provision” as well as performance measures and targets that 
enable the public to assess the level of service provided 
(2002). For specific groups of activities (which using 
standard terminology would be called output classes), 
some compulsory performance measures are set by the 
Department of Internal Affairs (Chief Executive of the 
Department of Internal Affairs, 2013). 
The New Zealand Office of the Auditor General (OAG) is 
involved in the review of local government performance 
measurement. Their 2010 report Local government: 
Examples of better practice in setting local authorities’ 
performance measures states that “better performance 
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information and reporting can help us understand and 
address the public sector’s current and ongoing challenges” 
(p. 5). OAG has also recently published guidance on local 
government annual reports, focusing on performance 
reporting. One of the key elements of this guidance is the 
concept of considering “to what quality standard” to provide 
services (NZ Office of the Auditor General, 2011, p. 5), using 
performance targets as an ex ante pricing mechanism, rather 
than simply using performance results to reward or punish 
managers. This approach to linking performance and funding 
is one that seldom appears in the international literature, 
but is relatively common in New Zealand.
Specifically Recommendatory
Many performance measurement authors have gone beyond 
descriptive and critical analysis of existing phenomena and 
made specific recommendations for enhanced performance 
measurement. Streib and Poister (1999) have suggested that 
a framework should be designed to improve managerial 
accountability, increase employee focus on organisational 
goals and improve service quality. Similarly, it has been 
suggested that performance measurement systems should 
facilitate a hands-off, autonomous style of management 
(Sanger, 2008). Performance measurement systems should 
also enable effective actions, rather than serve purely as 
control mechanisms (Broad et al., 2007). The design team 
identified three pairs of authors in particular who provided 
what were felt to be rigorous, logical, comprehensive and 
nuanced sets of recommendations: Kloot and Martin (2000), 
Ghobadian and Ashworth (1994), and Kravchuk and Schack 
(1996). 
At a more technical level, Kloot and Martin identify five key 
elements of a good performance framework:
1. A strategic, collaborative development of a 
performance management system involving all 
stakeholders.
2. In-house development of valid, council-specific 
measures to be used for organisational improvement 
and benchmarking with like councils.
3. Real-time, up-to-date performance information for 
all stakeholders to monitor progress, demonstrate 
accountability, and manage outcomes.
4. Integrated performance management system across 
the organisation focused on value-for-money, service 
delivery, and organizational improvement.
5. A focus on both financial and non-financial measures 
(Kloot & Martin, 2000, p. 248).
Ghobadian and Ashworth have four recommendations:
1. Create measures that meet the requirements of 
different organisational levels.
2. Capture the essence of both efficiency and 
effectiveness dimensions.
3. Provide a means of identifying trade-offs between 
various dimensions of performance. 
4. Include qualitative as well as quantitative measures. 
(Ghobadian & Ashworth, 1994, p. 50).
Kravchuk and Schack give ten core design principles aimed at 
alleviating common performance measurement challenges 
they have identified in the literature:
1. Formulate a clear and coherent mission, strategy, and 
objectives.
2. Develop an explicit measurement strategy covering 
categories of measures, specific measures, and data 
definitions.
3. Involve key users and customers in design and 
development.
4. Rationalise programmatic structure as a prelude to 
management.
5. Develop multiple sets of measures for multiple users
6. Consider the customer(s) of programmes and systems 
throughout the process.
7. Provide each user with sufficient detail for a clear 
picture of performance.
8. Periodically review and revise the measurement 
system
9. Take account of upstream, downstream, and lateral 
complexities.
10. Avoid excessive aggregation of information, as “more 
detail, in many instances, actually is preferable to 
less” (Kravchuk & Schack, 1996, pp. 350-357).
Comparison of these sets of recommendations illustrates 
several commonalities: collaborative development of 
frameworks and measures, focusing on the utility of 
performance measures, the examination of multiple facets 
of performance, balancing financial and non-financial 
perspectives, and linking measures through multiple levels 
(e.g. strategy to tactics).
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DEVELOPING FRAMEWORK DESIGN 
PRINCIPLES
Performance measurement frameworks are not relatively 
standard goods (Johnsen, 1999; Northcott & Taulapapa, 
2012). They should not be simply implemented “off the 
rack”, but rather require adaptation to their specific 
environment. The challenge for the design team was 
thus to synthesise this mass of literature into a set of 
useful design principles. Specific recommendations were 
relatively easy to consider; useful knowledge was more 
difficult to extract from the more descriptive and critical 
sources. After consideration and analysis, focused on 
ensuring a parsimonious but comprehensive set, eight 
principles were identified (Licensing and Compliance 
Services, 2014a). In developing these eight principles, 
much of the material gathered from the literature review 
was discarded, because it was felt to be either unnecessary 
or harmful. 
The following sections list the design principles and provide 
additional information to show how each was derived from 
the literature and the particular shape it took within the 
performance framework. 
1. Use a classical logic model (outcomes, outputs, inputs) as the 
primary structure
The first, and most important design principle utilised by the 
design team in setting up the framework was to structure 
it around a classical logic model, as summarised earlier, 
linking outcomes, outputs, activities and inputs.
This was done for several reasons. First, the logic model is 
well regarded internationally, commonly used in the New 
Zealand public sector and explicitly recommended by the 
Office of the Auditor General (Collier, 2006; Flynn, 1986; 
NZ Office of the Auditor General, 2011; NZ State Services 
Commission, 2003). Second, members of the design team 
were familiar with this approach from their prior research 
and experience. Third, and most importantly, the model was 
felt to be the most rational means of identifying relevant 
performance.
Organisations exist for a purpose (or range of purposes). 
Developing performance measures that are not explicitly 
linked to those purposes may be irrational (McAdam et 
al., 2011). While Johnsen (1999) has recommended a 
“decoupled” approach that develops indicators in isolation 
from overarching organisational goals, such an approach 
seems pointless. While such measures may be willingly 
adopted, if they are not aligned to organisational goals they 
are of limited if not zero relevance.
Using a logic model also makes it easy to clarify the 
difference between the elements of the model – such 
as outcomes, outputs and inputs – and their associated 
measures and targets. The two are often conflated. This can 
lead to confusion between the substantive service or effect 
– the what – and the indicators used to monitor this – the 
how well.
Linking outcomes, outputs and impacts also facilitates 
enhanced management. Every level of the model has vertical 
links. The model makes interrelationships explicit and 
allows for the testing of hypotheses. Low value activities 
and outputs can be identified when a limited correlation 
with outcome goals is shown. Understanding which inputs 
contribute to which services is invaluable (Brignall & 
Modell, 2000). 
A logic model can also help achieve Kravchuk and 
Schack’s (1996) recommendations in terms of rationalising 
programmatic structure, without actually requiring an 
organisational restructure.  A logic model, existing “on paper”, 
can reflect any of a myriad of actual organisational forms. 
This allows for the performance framework to be rational 
and logical even if the underlying organisational structure 
is chaotic.
By developing a logic model as a first step, all the other 
elements of a good performance framework could be added 
Figure 3. Relationship Between Logic Model 
Elements and Measures/Targets
 8
on. Had this underlying structure not been developed, it 
would have been difficult to achieve other design goals. 
2. Ensure clarity of mission from the Auckland Plan
Logic models are agnostic; what is entered into the various 
levels of outcome, output and input depends on the particular 
context involved. As noted earlier, the public sector can be 
chaotic, with a range of 
goals, objectives and 
stakeholders, and little 
clarity as to how best to 
balance that complexity 
(Carter et al., 1992; 
Kravchuk & Schack, 
1996). Customers and 
administrators may 
have quite different 
perceptions of desired 
goals, with politicians 
differing further (Kelly & Swindell, 2002). Behn (2003) has 
said that “before choosing a performance measure, public 
managers must first choose their purpose” (p. 589), and 
Vinzant and Vinzant are even more explicit: “performance 
measures derived directly from strategic goals and objectives, 
and links between strategic plans and budgets, (are)... 
critical elements of the strategic management process” (as 
cited in Poister & Streib, 2005, p. 46). Where there is no clear 
linkage between specific goals and performance measures, 
performance information may be used inappropriately to 
hold managers accountable for results they are not pursuing 
(Behn, 2003; Kloot & Martin, 2000). 
The Auckland Plan provided the vital tool in clarifying the 
mission, goals and objectives to feed into the top level of 
the framework. The Auckland Plan is a strategic masterplan, 
developed through a consultative political process, covering 
a thirty year period for Auckland, and setting out an 
overarching objective of creating “the world’s most liveable 
city” (Auckland Council, 2012a). Underneath this primary 
objective is a set of outcomes, one of which, a fair, safe and 
healthy Auckland, was deemed to be the most appropriate 
for LCS’s work.
This outcome was then deconstructed to identify six 
appropriate subordinate impacts:
1. An Auckland free of public nuisance.
2. Aucklanders safe from animal-related harm and 
nuisance.
3. Aucklanders undisturbed by noise pollution.
4. Safe food premises.
5. Safe health and hygiene premises.
6. A reduction in alcohol-related harm.
These six impacts, alongside the outcome noted earlier, 
formed the top level of the logic model, thus turning it from 
an agnostic, theoretical construct into one founded in its 
local environment. Analysis of the impacts then allowed for 
the identification of relevant output classes and outputs, as 
well as the identification of a set of processes and inputs. 
By ensuring clarity of mission, and combining this with a 
logic model, a rational structure for LCS activities could be 
developed. This structure was then populated with measures.
3. Keep financial information of secondary importance
One of the most common concerns cited in the performance 
literature is an overemphasis on financial performance 
measures to the detriment of other types (Ammons, 2002; 
Ghobadian & Ashworth, 1994; Kloot & Martin, 2000; Palmer, 
1993). Modell (2004, p.47) notes the key issue: “Much 
performance information may be compiled for seemingly 
symbolic use, whilst the real concern of senior management 
is still directed towards financial performance measures.” 
This can have negative effects for strategic direction and 
as such its avoidance was regarded as an important design 
principle.
This focus on financial information has traditionally been an 
issue not only for Auckland Council, but all local authorities 
in New Zealand. Indeed, a major third-party ‘performance 
report’ on local authorities focuses exclusively on financial 
information (Mitchell, 2014; Taxpayers’ Union, 2014). 
Many planning processes are budget-driven rather than 
strategy-led. There is little focus on outcome or even output 
performance indicators.
Figure 4. Six Impacts
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In implementing this design principle, the design team 
took a pragmatic approach and focused on how financial 
information was presented. Existing performance reports 
within Auckland Council often presented financial 
information in prime position. In the framework, financial 
information was relegated to the bottom-right quadrant of 
single-page reports, or to the end of longer reports.
Success in incorporating this design principle was mixed. 
While internal departmental customers were largely satisfied 
with the focus on service delivery, some customers outside 
the department still emphasised financial information. 
Managers were still more likely to be questioned on financial 
performance than on service delivery performance.
4. Link performance information to the budgetary process
The literature illustrates an interesting correlation: when 
financial information is the primary type of performance 
information examined, other performance information has 
little or no effect on budgeting processes (Berman & Wang, 
2000; Melkers & Willoughby, 2005; Poister & Streib, 2005). 
This creates two negative effects. First, if budgets are not 
based on all performance information, then they are unlikely 
to be rational and logical attempts to achieve organisational 
goals, and are thus likely to be merely the product of 
internal and external political processes. Secondly, if staff 
believe that non-financial performance information does 
not affect budgeting processes, they will lack the incentive 
to provide and use performance information (Melkers & 
Willoughby, 2005), thus harming organisational performance 
at the tactical, non-budgetary level. As such, the design 
team regarded linking performance information (other than 
financial) and budgeting as vital.
As noted, Auckland Council’s planning and budgeting 
processes are only tenuously linked to the performance 
measurement system. This is interesting given the emphasis 
in governmental guidance on identifying a specific level of 
service (output class target) and the cost required to deliver 
that service (2002; NZ Office of the Auditor General, 2010).
Within the LCS framework, efforts were made to link 
performance to budgets. Primarily, this was done at the 
output level. Efforts were relatively coarse, with difficulties 
including the problem of costing the quality of outputs – as 
so much of this is determined by staff, and staff costs are 
relatively constant independent of quality, costing different 
output qualities was almost impossible. Success was limited. 
During a major strategic planning process, central attention 
remained firmly fixed on financial elements.
5. Collaboratively design the framework
The literature has identified the value of involving staff in 
the development of performance measurement frameworks 
(Bititci et al., 2006; Carter et al., 1992; Kloot & Martin, 2000). 
Where staff are involved, performance frameworks are more 
legitimate (Streib & Poister, 1999). Incorporating the views 
of service users, citizens and front-line staff can also ensure 
that measures reflect all aspects of a service (Sanderson, 
2001). Kloot and Martin (2000) have noted that “culture is 
crucial in performance measurement” (p.246) and Sanger 
(2008) has called it a “hearts and minds” battle (p.S80); 
external imposition of performance measures is likely to 
lead to opposition rather than support (Fleming & Lafferty, 
2000). Despite this, some surveys have shown that low-level 
employees are seldom involved in the development of 
performance measures (Streib & Poister, 1999).
This principle was wholeheartedly embraced in the design 
of the framework. Elements were built from the bottom up by 
consulting with staff across the department to identify key 
outputs, processes, inputs and associated measures (Carter 
et al., 1992; van Sluis et al., 2008). There was a specific focus 
on the operating supervisor level, building on suggestions 
that it is at this level that the best results for performance 
measurement can be achieved (Ammons, 2002).
One shortcoming of the approach taken was a lack of 
involvement by participants outside the department, most 
specifically politicians and citizens, which might be seen as 
reducing legitimacy, direction and support (Wang & Berman, 
2000). It was consciously decided not to incorporate such 
perspectives as it was felt that the Auckland Plan, a product 
of a major political process that included consultation with 
citizens, provided sufficient guidance.
6. Carefully select measures
Substantial care was devoted to the selection of measures. 
Rather than relying solely on availability of data, there was 
a focus on identifying those metrics that would be most 
meaningful (Braga & Moore, 2003; Flynn, 1986; Loveday, 
2006; Smith, 1995a). Efficiency and effectiveness measures 
were identified (Ammons, 2002). The majority of measures 
chosen were output measures, as these were the most able 
to be controlled by staff, and the most amenable to frequent 
(monthly) measurement (Behn, 2003). It is hoped to evolve 
from an output-based framework to one that includes 
more substantial treatment of impact measures (Melkers & 
 10
Willoughby, 2005), but care must be taken to account for 
likely random variation at that level (Jacobs & Goddard, 
2007), which is outside managerial control. It was decided 
to avoid aggregation measures, based on findings that 
developing such measures can be difficult in highly complex 
environments such as the public sector (Jacobs & Goddard, 
2007; Kravchuk & Schack, 1996). 
It was decided to include a target for each measure where 
possible. Without a target, measures exist only in the 
abstract, and while change can be observed, the quality of 
that change is invisible (Ammons, 1995; Behn, 2003; Palmer, 
1993). Targets were collaboratively developed (Bovaird & 
Martin, 2003; Loeffler, 2001).
There was a deliberate emphasis on including measures 
where existing data were imperfect, relying on Heinrich’s 
(2002) finding that “imperfect data can still generate 
information that might effectively guide program managers 
in improving agency performance” (p. 721). In many cases, 
imperfect data were the result of gaps in time series, making 
Grizzle’s 1982 statement that “a time series not perceived 
as useful by today’s users might be perceived as useful by 
future users” still relevant today (p. 133).
Within the overarching logic model structure, measures and 
targets were seen as flexible elements. While outcomes, 
impacts, output classes, outputs, activities and inputs remain 
stable for the most part, the underlying measures are 
conceptualised as being in a state of flux. Different measures 
can be reported at different times, and new measures can be 
added on without fuss. This ensures that the framework can 
evolve and avoid ossification (Grizzle, 1982; Palmer, 1993; 
Sanger, 2008; Smith, 1995a).
The final factor involved in selecting measures was based on 
Kravchuk and Schack’s 1996 recommendation of an explicit 
measurement strategy. This was implemented through the 
development of a Planning and Performance Dictionary that 
described and explained each element of the model, and 
that incorporated calculation formulae where relevant. 
7. Design the framework in a way that minimises gaming
Performance measurement is by its very nature not a purely 
technical matter, so it is important to develop measures 
that affect behaviour positively (Grizzle, 1982). Given the 
incentives associated with many performance measurement 
systems, perverse behaviour is entirely understandable 
and logical (Carter et al., 1992; Heinrich, 2002; Loveday, 
2005; Pidd, 2005; van Sluis et al., 2008; Vollaard, 2006). 
Analysis of Comprehensive Performance Assessment results 
in the United Kingdom indicates gaming (the deliberate 
manipulation of performance results) in local government 
performance does occur (McLean et al., 2007), as do 
occasional scandals in the press about manipulation of 
crime statistics by police forces across the world (Barrett, 
2013). 
Several approaches were taken to minimise gaming. At 
the impact level, this largely involved finding independent 
sources that were “not corruptible” (Propper & Wilson, 2003, 
p. 20), such as other government agencies. For example, one 
of the desired outcomes of inspections of food premises is 
improved quality, and thus higher inspection grades. However, 
by setting a target for increasing average inspection grades, 
while also being responsible for setting those grades, one 
would be creating an opportunity for gaming; staff could 
deliberately overinflate the grades provided to give the 
impression of improving quality in premises. In the absence 
of an external auditor to review grades, the next best 
option was to obtain data relating to the incidence of food 
poisoning linked to retail food premises. This data cannot 
be affected by staff, but is linked to the average quality of 
food premises. 
8. Compile and distribute performance information in a timely 
manner
Performance information is worthless, or even a cost, if it is not 
utilised (Kravchuk & Schack, 1996). As such, the distribution 
of performance information in a timely manner was regarded 
as an important design principle. The framework was 
partly limited by Auckland Council performance reporting 
requirements, which imposed a monthly reporting cycle 
for most measures. This was problematic when assessing 
processing times (as applications may span reporting 
periods) or response times when the event and response 
may span reporting periods.
The framework focused on enriching the compulsory 
elements of the Auckland Council performance system with 
more in-depth monthly and ad-hoc reports. The former 
took the form of a modified Balanced Scorecard, (Braga & 
Moore, 2003; Brignall & Modell, 2000; Carmona & Gronlund, 
2003; Kloot & Martin, 2000; Wisniewski & Olafsson, 2004) 
with approximately sixteen measures reported for the 
department as a whole and for each of the major functional 
units. Enriching the quantitative information provided was a 
qualitative report on major highlights and achievements. An 
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annual report was also produced.
The key challenge going forward for the framework will be 
aligning the production and dissemination of performance 
information with key strategic planning processes. As 
Auckland Council largely determines its financial year 
budget six months ahead of time (i.e. for 2014/15, in 
December 2013), performance information is required early 
in the cycle. 
Challenges in Deployment
Designing the framework overcame the first challenge 
noted: the lack of a suitable model for use. However, 
several additional challenges were encountered when the 
framework was first deployed. These are summarised below, 
and a follow-up paper will examine them in greater detail.
The first deployment challenge was staff engagement. Some 
writers have concerns that performance management can 
deprofessionalise and commodify staff (Adcroft & Willis, 
2005). As such, the design team was aware of potential 
negative repercussions resulting from rollout of the 
framework. Efforts to alleviate this focused on taking a 
collaborative approach to the overall development of the 
framework, as well as clarifying logic model elements (e.g. 
outcomes, outputs) before specifying measures and targets. 
This latter aspect ensured that “what” was clarified, which 
enabled staff to better understand the “how much” and “to 
what quality” aspects. For the most part, there was little staff 
opposition to the framework, although this might have been 
due to the fact that it was not initially linked to individuals’ 
own personal performance reviews and thus remuneration. 
There was some staff criticism of the validity or accuracy of 
specific measures, which led the design team to undertake 
several cycles of data improvement.
A second deployment challenge was using impact and 
outcome measures in a meaningful way (this was both a 
design and a deployment challenge). While there were some 
very attractive impact measures, many were not usable due 
to the potential for perverse incentives where monitoring 
and enforcement roles were combined. The design team 
also found that for many staff, their role was perceived 
as restricted to creating outputs, rather than impacts and 
outcomes. For example, setting targets for reducing the 
number of dog attacks (based on the philosophy of reducing 
harm) was not fully accepted, whereas setting targets for 
the timeliness of response to dog-related calls for service 
was. This speaks to a more fundamental issue than merely 
performance measurement, namely the mission and function 
of specific public sector agencies.
A third deployment challenge was converting performance 
information into meaningful tactical and strategic actions. As 
noted, efforts to influence strategic planning processes were 
not particularly successful. At the tactical level, the issue was 
aligning the provision of information with opportunities 
for improvement; this was reflected in prioritising ad-hoc 
requests, but to attain a greater level of success will need 
to expand to more in-depth evaluation of practice and 
recommendations for improvement (Behn, 2003; Sanderson, 
2001).
A fourth deployment challenge was changing mindsets 
about financial performance information, particularly when 
discussing issues with the broader Council. The design team 
was well aware of the potential for this issue to develop, 
given the frequency of this problem being noted in the 
literature, but proved unable to convey this adequately to 
other stakeholders. This was particularly noticeable during 
discussions on budgeting, when efforts to link desired 
outputs to funding were often misunderstood.
DISCUSSION
The above study has traced how LCS developed and 
implemented a performance framework, basing that design 
on the relevant literature. In doing so, the design team 
attempted to ground practice in theory. Along the way, it 
identified several hypotheses worthy of further testing. 
In using a formal logic model/outcomes framework, the 
design team was initially guided solely by its logical 
coherence and pre-eminence in the literature. However, they 
found during deployment that this tool was particularly 
useful in explaining linkages between actions and results, 
and in developing hierarchies of measures. As such, this 
suggests:
H1: Performance measurement is enhanced by the use 
of a formal logic model linked to stated organisational 
goals.
The design team encountered relatively little opposition 
to the framework, despite there being clear evidence in the 
literature that such might emerge. They considered that this 
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might be due to the collaborative approach taken, or because 
the framework was not linked to personal remuneration 
systems. As such, this suggests:
H2: Acceptance of performance measurement practices by 
staff is enhanced by the use of collaborative approaches 
to the development of performance measures.
H3: Acceptance of performance measurement practices 
by staff is inversely related to the use of performance 
measurement to set personal remuneration.
However, the above poses an interesting conundrum: if 
there is no link between performance measurement and 
remuneration, how can it influence behaviour and thus 
organisational performance? There may thus be a complex 
relationship between the acceptance of a framework and its 
meaningfulness.
In relation to this, no gaming behaviour was discovered 
during the deployment of the framework. This might be 
linked to the way in which the framework was developed 
and its lack of links to individual remuneration. As such, this 
suggests:
H4: The prevalence of gaming behaviour is correlated to 
the degree to which performance measures are imposed 
by an external party.
H5: The prevalence of gaming behaviour is correlated 
to the degree to which performance indicators affect 
individual remuneration.
Lastly, the design team noted during discussions within the 
organisation that, for the most part, there was both little 
interest in and little belief that performance was inadequate 
in non-financial activities, that is, core service delivery such 
as alcohol inspections or responding to noise complaints. 
This was almost a case of treating non-financial performance 
as a fixed quantity and quality, and financial measures as 
variable. As such, this suggests:
H6: Financial performance information is prioritised 
because the value of other activities is taken as a given.
H7: The use of non-financial performance measures is 
inversely related to the importance placed on financial 
performance measures by an organisation.
Alongside these hypotheses, it might be worthwhile to 
evaluate the impact of theoretically grounded performance 
frameworks on organisational performance, whether 
compared to the preceding situation or non-theoretically 
grounded frameworks in similar organisations. This would 
require a clear distinction between “performance” and 
“performance measurement” but could be illuminating. If, for 
example, the evidence suggests that either all performance 
frameworks, or merely those founded on the literature, have 
minimal effects on actual performance, it might suggest that 
perceptions of performance measurement that emphasise 
its symbolic value are accurate (Brignall & Modell, 2000; 
Modell, 2004; Roy & Segun, 2000).
Lastly, the author humbly suggests that the design principles 
utilised in developing the LCS framework might be utilised 
for the development of performance frameworks in similar 
organisational units. This would enable the hard-won 
learnings of the team to be disseminated more broadly in 
the hope of improving practice.
CONCLUSION
This study has shown how the LCS team confronted their 
primary challenge, namely the lack of a suitable model, 
by examining the public sector performance literature, 
separating it into descriptive/critical and normative/
recommendatory groupings. 
From this review, the LCS team distilled eight design principles:
1. Use a classical logic model (outcomes, outputs, inputs) 
as the primary structure.
2. Ensure clarity of mission from the Auckland Plan.
3. Keep financial information of secondary importance
4. Link performance information to the budgetary 
process
5. Collaborative design of the framework.
6. Careful selection of measures. 
7. Design the framework in a way that minimises gaming
8. Compile and distribute performance information in a 
timely manner.
Each of these principles was then applied in varying 
ways and to varying extents. The logic model was used to 
rationally link goals and actions. Alignment to the strategic 
plan ensured clarity of mission and thus the rationale for 
actions. Financial information was given a physically less 
imposing position in published reports. Some minor efforts 
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were made to link performance information to budgeting 
processes, primarily through output costing.
A collaborative approach, including staff consultation, was 
used to develop the logic model, specific measures and targets, 
and was successful in increasing staff acceptance. Measures 
were selected that encompassed multiple levels of the 
logic model (outcomes, outputs, inputs). Efforts to minimise 
gaming were successful, but as time passes and performance 
information is more closely linked to remuneration, this may 
change. The framework was successful in compiling and 
distributing performance information in a timely manner, 
despite challenges posed by the calculation formulae of 
specific time-bound measures.
The experiences of the design team enabled it to identify 
a range of hypotheses linking the use and benefits of 
performance measurement with specific antecedents. One 
potentially intriguing relationship identified is that between 
the acceptance of a framework and its meaningfulness.
In developing this framework, the design team found 
themselves in a seemingly contradictory space, existing 
simultaneously in both the unknown territory of developing 
a theory-grounded framework, and yet also on familiar 
ground in terms of the literature within which they worked. 
It is hoped that this particular approach might be more 
broadly applicable, and that this study provides some small 
increase in knowledge for practice.
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